Six Point Movement in Bangladesh free essay sample

After the announcement of 6 points by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in 1966, the then Bhashani NAP, pro-China Communist groups and Chhatra Union (Menon Group) were the first to articulate their reaction. They claimed that the 6 points were in fact the creation of American intelligence agency, CIA. Its aim was to develop rapport with the USA by creating problems for Ayub Khan. But such an explanation on the origin of 6 points was not accepted or proved by anyone later. Some people opine that the 6 points were in fact the creation of some Bangali CSP officers — Ruhul Quddus, Shamsur Rahman Khan, Ahmed Fazlur Rahman. A segment of the people are of the view that the 6 points were the joint production of intellectuals including the economics professor of Dhaka University. Alongside this, another quarter believes that the 6 points were prepared by a group of leftist politicians of India. There was another segment who used to claim that Ayub Khan used his favorite bureaucrat Altaf Gauhar to prepare the document and then handed that over to Khairul Kabir (the then General Manager of Krishi Bank). We will write a custom essay sample on Six Point Movement in Bangladesh or any similar topic specifically for you Do Not WasteYour Time HIRE WRITER Only 13.90 / page His goal was to elicit political dividends. Because of these contradictory claims and contrary views regarding the drafting of 6 points, its origin still remains unclear and shrouded in mystery. The 6 points 1. The constitution should provide for a Federation of Pakistan in its true sense based on the Lahore Resolution and the parliamentary form of government with supremacy of a Legislature directly elected on the basis of universal adult franchise. 2. The federal government should deal with only two subjects: Defence and Foreign Affairs, and all other residual subjects should be vested in the federating states. . Two separate, but freely convertible currencies for two wings should be introduced; or if this is not feasible, there should be one currency for the whole country, but effective constitutional provisions should be introduced to stop the flight of capital from East to West Pakistan. Furthermore, a separate Banking Reserve should be established and separate fiscal and monetary policy be adopted for East Pakistan. 4. Th e power of taxation and revenue collection should be vested in the federating units and the federal centre would have no such power. The federation would be entitled to a share in the state taxes to meet its expenditures. 5. There should be two separate accounts for the foreign exchange earnings of the two wings; the foreign exchange requirements of the federal government should be met by the two wings equally or in a ratio to be fixed; indigenous products should move free of duty between the two wings, and the constitution should empower the units to establish trade links with foreign countries. 6. East Pakistan should have a separate militia or paramilitary force. Six-point Programme a charter of demands enunciated by the A for removing disparity between the two wings of Pakistan and bring to an end the internal colonial rule of West Pakistan in East Bengal. The Indo-Pak War of 1965 ended with the execution of Taskent Treaty. To the old grievances of economic disparity added the complain of negligence and indifference of central government towards the defence of East Pakistan. Bangabandhu   was vocal on this issue. The leaders of the opposition parties of West Pakistan convened a national convention at Lahore on 6 February 1966 with a view to ascertain the post-Taskent political trend. Bangabandhu reached Lahore on 4 February along with the top leaders of Awami League, and the day following he placed the Six-point Charter of demand before the subject committee as the demands of the people of East Pakistan. He created pressure to include his proposal in the agenda of the conference. They rejected the proposal of Bangabandhu. On the following day the newspapers of West Pakistan published reports on the Six-point programme, and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was projected as a separatist. Consequently Sheikh Mujib abandoned the conference. The Six-point programme along with a proposal of movement for the realisation of the demands was placed before the meeting of the working committee of Awami League on 21 February 1966, and the proposal was carried out unanimously. A booklet on the Six-point Programme with introduction from Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujib and Tajuddin Ahmad was published. Another booklet entitled Amader Banchar Dabi : 6-dafa Karmasuchi (Our demands for existence : 6-points Programme) was published in the name of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, and was distributed in the council meeting of Awami League held on 18 March 1966. Six points 1. The constitution should provide for a Federation of Pakistan in its true sense on the Lahore Resolution and the parliamentary form of government with supremacy of a Legislature directly elected on the basis of universal adult franchise. 2. The federal government should deal with only two subjects : Defence and Foreign Affairs, and all other residuary subjects shall be vested in the federating states. 3. Two separate, but freely convertible currencies for two wings should be introduced ; or if this is not feasible, there should be one currency for the whole country, but effective constitutional provisions should be introduced to stop the flight of capital from East to West Pakistan. Furthermore, a separate Banking Reserve should be established and separate fiscal and monetary policy be adopted for East Pakistan. 4. The power of taxation and revenue collection shall be vested in the federating units and the federal centre will have no such power. The federation will be entitled to a share in the state taxes to meet its expenditures. 5. There should be two separate accounts for the foreign exchange earnings of the two wings ; the foreign exchange requirements of the federal government should be met by the two wings equally or in a ratio to be fixed; indigenous products should move free of duty between the two wings, and the constitution should empower the units to establish trade links with foreign countries. . East Pakistan should have a separate militia or paramilitary force. The opposition leaders of West Pakistan looked at Mujibs Six-point Programme as a device to disband Pakistan, and hence they outright rejected his proposal. The Ayub government arrested him and put him on trial what is known as AGARTALA CONSPIRACY CASE. The case led to widespread agitation in East Pakistan culminating in t he mass uprising of early 1969. Under public pressure, government was forced to release him unconditionally on 22 February 1969. The Awami League sought public mandate in favour of the six point programme in the general elections of 1970 in which Mujib received the absolute mandate from the people of East Pakistan in favour of his six point. But Zulfiqar Ali Bhuttu refused to join the session of the National Assembly scheduled to be held on 3 March 1971 unless a settlement was reached between the two leaders beforehand. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and his party sat in a protracted dialogue from 15 March 1971. The dialogue failed to produce any positive result. The army crackdown of 25 March sealed the fate of the six point including the fate of Pakistan. [Ashfaq Hossain] The Significance of the Six-Point Movement and its Impact on Bangladesh’s Struggle for Freedom and Self-determination Introduction: The historic Six-Point movement in 1966 was the turning point in Bangladesh’s quest for greater autonomy and self-determination from Pakistan’s colonial domination. The six-point demand has been widely credited as the ‘charter of freedom’ in the history of Bangladesh’s struggle for freedom and independence. The six-point plan had envisaged, among other things, a full-blown federal form of Government based on the 1940 Lahore Resolution, a parliamentary system of government directly elected by the people on the basis of adult franchise, two separate currencies or two reserve banks for the two wings of Pakistan, and a para-military force for East Pakistan. The spectacular success of the six-point movement in 1966 had prompted the ruling coterie of Pakistan to discredit the organizers of this movement. Although Ayub Khan’s diabolical regime had used various brutal punitive measures against the proponents, organizers and supporters of the six-point formula, this historic movement had seriously impacted and conditioned the subsequent political development in Pakistan. The main purpose of this paper is to assess the significance of the six-point movement and its impact on Bangladesh’s struggle for freedom and self-determination. Once the main contents of the six-point plan are summarized, the nature, magnitude, and impact of the six-point movement will be appraised. Aimed at substantiating and validating my own observations about the magnitude and impact of the six-point movement, some scholarly observations will be cited. Finally, some concluding remarks will be made. The Six-Point Plan: the Main Elements Sheikh Mujibur Rhaman, the then General Secretary of the East Pakistan Awami League (EPAL), had personally submitted the six-point program to the subject-matter committee of the All-Party Meeting of the opposition political parties of the then Pakistan in Lahore on February 5, 1966. Based on his â€Å"6-Point Formula: Our Right to Live† [March 23, 1966], the chief demands and themes of the historic six-point plan are being summarized as follows: Point 1: â€Å"The Constitution should provide for a Federation of Pakistan in its true sense on the basis of [1940] Lahore Resolution, and Parliamentary form of Government with supremacy of legislature directly elected on the basis of universal adult franchise. † Point 2: The Federal Government of Pakistan â€Å"shall deal with only two subjects, viz. defense and Foreign Affairs, and all other residuary subjects shall vest in the federating states. † Point 3: â€Å"Two separate but freely convertible currencies for two wings [of Pakistan] should be introduced;† or if this is not feasible, there should be one currency for the whole country, but effective constitutional provisions should be introduced to stop the flight of capital from East to West Pakistan. Furthermore, a separate Banking Rese rve should be established and separate fiscal and monetary policy to be adopted for East Pakistan. Point 4: The power of taxation and revenue collection shall be vested in the â€Å"federating units and the Federal Centre will have no such power. † However, the Federation will be entitled to have a share in the state taxes to meet its expenditures. â€Å"The Consolidated Federal Fund shall come out of a levy of certain percentage of all state taxes. † Point 5: There should be two separate accounts for the foreign exchange earnings of the two wings with clear assurance that â€Å"earnings of East Pakistan shall be under the control of East Pakistan Government and that of West Pakistan under the control of West Pakistan Government. And the â€Å"foreign exchange requirements of the Federal Government [of Pakistan] should be met by the two wings equally or in a ratio to be fixed. The indigenous products should move free of duty between the two wings. † The Constitution should â€Å"empower the units [provinces] to establish trade and commercial relations with, set up trade missions in and enter into agreements with foreign countries. † Point 6: East Pakistan should have a separate â€Å"militia† or â€Å"para-military† force. Immediate Reactions of the Pakistani Political Leaders to the Six-Point Plan Instead of endorsing Sheikh Mujib’s legitimate six-point-based demand for â€Å"maximum† provincial autonomy, the mainstream leaders of the so-called opposition parties for establishing democracy in Pakistan were not even willing to include his proposal in the official agenda of the conference for initiating discussion on the merits or demerits of the of the proposed six-point demands. In fact, no West Pakistani political leaders (not even Nawabzada Nasarullah Khan, the President of the then All-Pakistan Awami League) were willing to lend any support to Sheikh Mujib’s clarion call for maximum provincial autonomy based on the proposed six-point program. It is also really appalling to recapitulate even after forty long years that the non-Awami League delegates from the then East Pakistan did not endorse the six-point demand. Like their West-Pakistani counterparts, Bengali speaking renegades had also smelled an element of â€Å"secession† or â€Å"disintegration† of Pakistan in the six-point program. In fact, Sheikh Mujib’s six-point demand could not be pried out of the â€Å"subject-matter committee† of that so-called All-party conference. Rather, the proposed six-point anchored proposal for maximum provincial autonomy had received frontal attacks from the mainstream ruling elite of Pakistan. The veteran West Pakistani political stalwarts, in conjunction with their cohorts from the then East Pakistan, had started a slanderous propaganda campaign against Sheikh Mujibur Rahman the chief architect and proponent of the six-point charter even though most of those instant criticisms of the roposed six-point program were characterized by blatant falsehoods, conjectures, distortions, and innuendoes. Yet Sheikh Mujibur Rahman refused to be blackmailed or intimidated by those critics. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s Immediate Response to the Critics In a press conference at Lahore on February 10, 1966, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman had pointed out the uselessness and irrelevance of the All-Party Conference. He had clearly articulated that the question of demanding genuine â€Å"provincial autonomy† based on the proposed six-point program should not be misconstrued or dismissed as â€Å"provincialism. † He underscored that the proposed six-point demand was not designed to harm the common people of West Pakistan. He had pointed out that the 17-day war between Pakistan and India (1965) made it crystal clear to the â€Å"East Pakistanis† that the defense of East Pakistan couldn’t be contingent upon the mercy or courtesy of West Pakistan. He reminded the audience that instead of relying on West Pakistan for its own defense a distant land located one thousand miles away, East Pakistan should be made self-sufficient for the purpose of defending itself from external aggression. He also made it abundantly clear that his six-point plan for â€Å"maximum† provincial autonomy reflected the long-standing demands of the people of East Pakistan. On his return from Lahore to Dhaka on February 11, 1966, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman had provided further clarification on his six-point demands in a press conference. He explained why he had disassociated himself from the All-Party conference in Lahore. He had clearly stated that the delegates from East Pakistan Awami League (EPAL) had rejected not only the proposals passed by the All-Party Conference but also severed all ties with the disgruntled leaders of this so-called conference of the opposition parties. He said that it was not at all possible for him or his party to â€Å"betray the genuine interests† of the aggrieved and deprived people of East Pakistan. He emphasized that the immediate adoption and implementation of his six-point demand â€Å"will be conducive to foster durable relationship between two provinces of Pakistan. † In a press conference on February 14, 1966, he reiterated that the â€Å"the question of autonomy appears to be more important for East Pakistan after the 17-day war between Pakistan and India. The time is ripe for making East Pakistan self-sufficient in all respects. † Reaction of Ayub Khan’s Dictatorial Regime to the Six-Point Plan Immediately after the provincial autonomy plan based on the six-point formula was unveiled by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman at the Lahore conference of opposition political parties in early February, 1966, the military autocracy of the self-declared Field Marshal Ayub Khan was quick to denounce it as a separatist or secessionist move. Aimed at browbeating the dedicated champions of greater provincial autonomy, Ayub Khan, the autocratic President of the then Islamic Republic of Pakistan, had started discrediting both the message and the messenger of the six-point program. Appearing in the final session of the Pakistan (Convention) Muslim League in Dhaka on March 21,1966 (of course being fully attired in the army General’s khaki uniform with full display of all of his regalia and medallions), the self-declared President of the then Pakistan had condemned the six-point based plan for maximum provincial autonomy in the harshest possible terms. Characterizing the six-point formula for provincial autonomy as a demand for â€Å"greater sovereign Bengal,† Ayub Khan had claimed that such a plan would put the â€Å"Bengali Muslims† under the permanent domination of the â€Å"caste Hindus† of neighboring West Bengal. Comparing the â€Å"prevailing situation† in Pakistan [as of March, 1966] with the volatile situation that had existed in the USA before the outbreak of a prolonged Civil War in early 1860s, the self-serving President of Pakistan also arrogated himself by saying that the nation might have to face a â€Å"civil war† if such were forced upon â€Å"him† by the â€Å"secessionists. † He had even threatened the â€Å"autonomists† and â€Å"secessionists† with â€Å"dire consequences† if they failed to shun the idea of six-point based movement for provincial autonomy. He had also the audacity to underscore that the â€Å"language of weapons† would be ruthlessly employed for exterminating the â€Å"secessionist elements from Pakistan. † Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the flamboyant Foreign Minister of Pakistan, had openly challenged Sheikh Mujibur Rahman to a public debate on the strengths and weaknesses of the proposed six-point plan at Paltan Maidan in Dhaka. To the chagrin of the Ayub regime, Tajuddin Ahmed, number 2 person in the then Awami League, took up the challenge on behalf of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Unfortunately, it was Z. A. Bhutto who did not show up for debate! Abdul Monem Khan, the then infamous Governor of East Pakistan, had publicly stated that â€Å"as long as I remain Governor of this province (East Pakistan), I would see to it that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman remains in jail. † Sheikh Mujibur Rahman Launches the Six-Point Movement In response to such false accusations and vile threats, a fearless Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was quick to respond. In a mammoth public gathering at Paltan Maidan, he thundered: â€Å"No amount of naked threats can deviate the deprived Bangalees from their demand for provincial autonomy based on their six-point demands. The greatest champion of Bangalees’ rights for self-determination, along with top leaders of the Awami League, kept on addressing numerous public meetings in the nooks and corners of the then East Pakistan. Without wasting a moment, the entire Awami League and the East Pakistan Students’ League (EPSL), its student front, were geared toward mobilizing and motivating the general mass es in favor of demanding self-government and autonomy based on the six-point program. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman had presented not only the bold proposal for â€Å"maximum provincial autonomy† but he also launched a viable mass movement (which he himself led till he was put in jail on May 9, 1966) for popularizing and mobilizing support for the six-point program. After proposing his historic six-point program, he had actually invested all of his energies and resources in disseminating the fundamental message of â€Å"maximum autonomy† for East Pakistan. He started articulating both the rationale and justification for proposing â€Å"maximum provincial autonomy† based on his six-point plan. However, before launching a full-fledged mass movement for realizing his six-point demands, Sheikh Mujib had initiated some strategic intra-party measures. The Council Session of the East Pakistan Awami League (EPAL) met on March 18, 19, 20, 1966, and that council session had also restructured the working Committee of the party. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and Tajuddin Ahmed were unanimously elected the President and General Secretary respectively of the newly revamped Awami League. The proposed six-point program was also unanimously endorsed by that historic council session for realizing maximum provincial autonomy for the then East Pakistan. To the dismay of Pakistan’s ruling coterie, the six-point program had generated a great deal of enthusiasm among the people of the then East Pakistan. As noted by Dr. Talukder Maniruzzaman: â€Å"To say that this [six-point] programme evoked tremendous enthusiasm among the people of East Bengal would be an understatement. Encouraged by overwhelming popular support, Sheikh Mujib convened a meeting of the EPAL Council [March 18-20, 1966] at which his [Six-Point] programme was unanimously approved and he was elected President of the [Awami League] party. With a phalanx of organizers from the Student’s League, Sheikh Mujib then launched a vigorous campaign. For about three months (from mid-February to mid-May), the urban centers of East Bengal seemed to be in the grip of a ‘mass revolution,’ prompting the Central Government to arrest Sheikh Mujib and his chief lieutenants (Tajuddin Ahmed, Khandokar Mustaq Ahmed, Mansoor Ali, Zahur Ahmed Chowdhury, and others) under the [infamous] Defense of Pakistan Rules and put down a complete general strike in Dacca (June 7, 1966) by killing 13 participating strikers† [Talukder Maniruzzaman, The Bangladesh Revolution and Its Aftermath, UPL, 1988. P. 25]. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s demand for â€Å"maximum autonomy† based on his six-point formula seems to have shaken the foundation of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. The six-point plan had exposed the fact that the real intention of Pakistan’s ruling elite was to â€Å"strengthen† the Punjabi-Mohajir dominated Central Government. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman repeatedly said in several public meetings that that the people of Pakistan had always desired a â€Å"strong Pakistan,† not a â€Å"strong Central Government. The entire ruling establishment of Pakistan was alarmed, and obviously, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the chief proponent of the six-point program, had become the main target of negative publicity. He had to endure various virulent forms of harassment, intimidation, and fraudulent cases. Instead of fairly addressing the legitimate grievances and demands of the neglected eastern province of Pakistan, the power elite took a deliberate decision to s uppress the quest for maximum provincial autonomy through the use of colonial types of repressive methods and procedures.